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In the paper a multilevel intellectual approach to HTTP-requests legitimacy validation is proposed. The approach is devised for 
HTTP-flood DDoS-attacks detection and prevention in telecommunication networks with a web-server as the target attack ob-
ject. The analysis of HTTP-requests attributes and their signatures is provided. On the basis of the analysis the attributes are 
separated into several levels that allow us to design a flow analyzer in a form of the multilevel block. Due to a multilevel struc-
ture of the flow analyzer a minimization of resources, spent for a request handling, is achieved.  
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Introduction 
 
Network information resources defense against ex-
ternal attacks of malefactors is one of the vital problems 
nowadays. The most widespread attacks at present are 
DoS-attacks (Denial of Service). The main goal of such 
attacks is to make a network resource inaccessible to its 
intended users. Generally an attack is launched on a big 
amount of hosts, i.e. an attack is distributed, or DDoS 
(Distributed Denial-of-Service). The process is con-
trolled by malicious software, which is installed using 
client’s workstation software or protocols vulnerabili-
ties (the most common software is a browser, its plug-
ins, Java and Flash) [1]. 
Defense against Denial-of-Service attacks involves 
blocking a malicious traffic without obstructing a legit-
imate users’ traffic (clients’ requests and server replies). 
By the term “a legitimate request” we mean a request, 
which is not indented to cause a denial of system’s ser-
vice and is not sent by malefactor. So, “a legitimate cli-
ent” is a client, who sends legitimate requests. In the 
case of non-distributed attack (DoS) the problem of 
blocking malicious traffic is not an intricate one. It is 
enough to detect an IP-address, which causes the great-
est activity, i.e. uses a wide bandwidth, has a high re-
quests frequency, a big amount of POST requests etc. 
In the case of a distributed attack (DDoS) obvious 
signs, which can be used for malefactor detection are 
missed. 
A significant amount of works is devoted to the 
problem of resources defense against DDoS-attacks. 
Among them are the works [8], [9], [10].  
 
The goal of this paper is to devise the approach for 
HTTP-flood DDoS-attacks detection and prevention in 
telecommunication networks with a web-server as the 
target attack object in which a used amount of compu-
ting resources varies depending on the difficulty of ma-
licious requests detection. 
 
 
Problem definition 
 
 
Let’s consider the defense system against DDoS-
attacks based on a flow analyzer (fig.1). The mixed 
flow of legitimate users’ requests and malicious re-
quests comes to the system input. Ideally, a flow ana-
lyzer must make a decision of requests legitimacy and 
accomplish a distinct separation of legitimate and mali-
cious requests. In the sequel, legitimate requests must 
be handled with a web-server and then a response must 
be sent. In the case of unsuccessful legitimacy test sev-
eral variants are possible: error code is sent to a client; 
close connection without sending any response is ex-
ploited; malicious IP address is blocked with a firewall 
and the connection closes.  
The goal of a defense system is to determine an af-
filiation of incoming request to one of the sets – “legit-
imate requests” or “illegitimate requests” based on de-
fined set of HTTP-request attributes. It is necessary to 
note, that an important value is an amount of resources, 
spent by flow analyzer for the handling of a request. 
This value should be minimized. 
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Fig. 1 – Separation of legitimate requests and malicious re-
quests 
Under these conditions the problem is reduced to the 
following one: 
Given: 
1) r – incoming HTTP-request 
2)  – defined set of 
HTTP-request attributes, where n – the amount 
of determined attributes for the i incoming 
request; 
3) R ={RL, RNL} – set of request classes: RL 
– legitimate, RNL – illegitimate; 
4) Pi – computing resources (power), 
spent by a flow analyzer for one attribute check.  
Find: 
Algorithm  
Analysis of a set of HTTP-request attributes. 
Let’s consider an example of a request in a form of the 
following listing (listing 1) to define a set of attributes, 
which are typical for an average legitimate request: 
Listing 1 – Example of HTTP-request 
 
On the analysis of such a request it is possible to de-
termine the set of attributes, summarized in Table 1 [2]: 
 
Table 1. 
Request attributes and their signatures 
 
Based on these attributes a flow analyzer can make a 
decision of request legitimacy. A process of particular 
attributes check differs according to the level of diffi-
culty. That’s why the amount of computing resources 
may vary depending on requests. 
Let a flow analyzer check all the defined attributes 
during request handling. Then an amount of computing 
resources (power) P spent by a flow analyzer during a 
check of one attribute, is equal to: 
 
As it can be seen, all the attributes are checked, re-
sources are not minimized. The resultant value of the 
expression under summation will be reduced under the 
two following conditions: 
1) Pi values are reduced; 
2) some of Pi terms are excluded from the 
expression. 
Values of Pi are considered to be constant values. 
xi Request attribute Signature 
x1 
Method to be performed on the 
resource identified by the Re-
quest-URI 
Specified as the first parameter 
in the first row 
x2 Request string 
Specified as the second parame-
ter in the first row 
x3 
Protocol of the re-
quests/protocol version 
Specified as the third parameter 
in the first row 
x4 
Version of the client software, 
operating system of the host, 
where client’s software is run-
ning 
Header “User-Agent”  
x5 
Specification of certain media 
types, which are acceptable for 
the response 
Header “Accept”  
x6 
Content-codings acceptable in a 
response Header “Accept-Encoding”  
x7 
The set of natural languages 
that are preferred as a response 
to the request 
Header “Accept-Language”  
x8 
Specification of options that are 
desired for a particular connec-
tion 
Header “Connection”  
x9 Headers order 
A full list of request headers is 
analyzed before receiving a 
double end-of-line symbol 
(CRLF) 
x10 Client IP-address 
Specified on network layer of 
TCP/IP model and is available 
on application layer 
x11 
Request frequency per IP ad-
dress Specified on web-server level 
x12 Presence of specific headers 
From, Proxy-Connection, Via 
etc. 
GET /page.html HTTP/1.1 
Host: www.example.com 
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; 
Linux x86_64; rv:18.0) Gecko/20100101 
Firefox/18.0 
Accept: 
text/html,application/xhtml+xml,appli
cation/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate 
Referer: http://www.example.com 
Cookie: c1=cookie1_value; 
c2=cookie2_value 
Connection: keep-alive 
legitimate  
requests together 
with malicious 
Closing 
connection 
Handling 
request with 
web-server 
Response to 
the client’s 
request 
flow analyzer 
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Besides, obtains an ambiguity factor. For instance, 
missing of User-Agent header or blank string as a User-
Agent value unambiguously signifies an illegitimacy of 
the request [2]. 
Based on cogitation about computing resources min-
imization and attributes’ ambiguity, we propose to 
make a flow analyzer as a modular multilevel non-
monolithic block (fig. 2). 
 
 
Fig. 2 – Modular multilevel structure of a flow analyzer 
The flow analyzer modules form a chain, and re-
quests flow comes to input of this chain. Actually the 
input of the first module is the input of a flow analyzer. 
At output of each module two scenarios are possible:  
1. to block requests and interrupt the chain, if a 
decision of request’s illegitimacy is made; 
2. to transfer requests flow from output to input of 
the next module for further analysis. 
The output of the last module is the output of a flow 
analyzer. 
Each module corresponds to a certain subset of at-
tributes . In such a way the problem of mini-
mization is solved. The remaining problem is divided 
into four subtasks (by the number of flow analyzer 
modules): 
To find an algorithm 
 
The first three modules of a chain handle the check 
of necessary, but not sufficient conditions for making 
decision about request legitimacy, while conditions for 
making decision of illegitimacy are sufficient. 
From our point of view, modular approach has the 
following advantages: 
− independence of the logic of each module from 
other modules in the chain; 
− ability to disable particular modules; 
− ability to extend a flow analyzer by adding new 
independent modules to the chain. 
Thin configuration of requests handling. Modern 
web-servers allow intellectual agents to take a set of 
preventing steps against DDoS-attacks. During the re-
search a set of request handling principles, which can 
be observed with a native web-server configuration, is 
formed:  
1. Not to handle client requests (close 
connection or return error code): 
− in which header User-Agent is missing; 
− in which User-Agent header value is an 
empty string; 
− in which the following substrings: 
“bot”, “index”, “spider”, “crawl”, 
“wget”, “slurp”, “libwww”, “curl”, 
“wget”, “lynx”, “urllib”, “ruby”, “php”, 
“perl”, “python”, “java”, “http://” are 
found while checking User-Agent 
header value with a regular expression. 
2. To restrict an allowed request frequency per 
IP. 
X1 = {x4, x11} – defined subset of HTTP-request at-
tributes 
Substrings = {“bot”, “index”, “spider”, “crawl”, 
“wget”, “slurp”, “libwww”, “curl”, “wget”, “lynx”, 
“urllib”, “ruby”, “php”, “perl”, “python”, “java”, 
“http://”} 
So, checking the incoming HTTP-request by this 
module is handled according to the following rule: 
 
IF (x4 is missing) OR (x4 ∩ Substrings)  
OR (x11 > T) THEN r → RNL, 
 
where T is an allowed threshold of requests frequency. 
Checking the client’s ability to JavaScript code 
processing. During DDoS-attack HTTP-requests are 
sent through web-browser not by user, but by special-
ized intellectual agents with limited functionality. Gen-
erally they are not able to process JavaScript, Adobe 
Flash, to send or accept cookies. In our view, these af-
finities may be used for testing requests legitimacy. 
Common scheme of testing request legitimacy is 
shown on Fig. 3. 
 
 
Fig. 3 – Common scheme of testing request legitimacy  
A classical request processing involves two stages: 
request and response [1]. The proposed scheme con-
tains two extra stages. After receiving a client request a 
server sends a code for checking request legitimacy. It 
may be math calculation with JavaScript, Adobe Flash, 
handling cookies or other methods intrinsic for web-
Thin 
configura
tion of 
request 
handling 
Check  
of client’s 
ability to 
 handle  
a JavaScript 
code  
Decision 
about  
request han-
dling based 
on the geo-
attributes 
Intellectual  
decision based  
on the signature 
method 
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browser. In the case of a successful code execution the 
client receives the content, which has been requested 
and specified in request headers [3]. 
Let’s denote the ability to process a JavaScript code 
as x13. 
X2 = {x13} – defined subset of HTTP-request attrib-
utes 
 
A check of incoming HTTP-request by this module 
is handled according to the following rule: 
 
IF (x13 IS EQUAL TO 0) THEN r → RNL 
Making decision on request processing based on 
geo-attributes. In some cases it is appropriate to re-
strict a request processing based on clients belonging to 
certain geographical territory. It concerns web-
resources, a core target audience of which is concen-
trated in certain geographical territory. For example, a 
company, which carries on business in one or several 
countries, is interested in successful access to its web-
site clients from these countries first. From this point of 
view, requests from other geographical territories may 
be neglected. 
To implement this level of flow analyzer a GeoIP 
database may be used. On the basis of this database an 
IP detects a geographical location of network host. Dur-
ing a request an IP address is sent to a GeoIP database. 
It is possible to receive a two-letter country code ac-
cording to ISO-3166-1 [4] as a response. 
Let’s denote a belonging of client IP-address to cer-
tain geographical territory as x14.  
X3 = {x14} – defined subset of HTTP-request attrib-
utes. 
C ={Ci} – set of two-letter country codes, access 
from which is allowed. 
A check of incoming HTTP-request by this module 
is handled according to the following rule: 
IF (x14  C) THEN r → RNL 
 
Intellectual decision-making based on the signa-
ture method.  
Application of the signature method on HTTP proto-
col level allows us to detect an intellectual agent with a 
high probability. This method of identification is based 
on the matching client’s request headers to a set of pre-
defined criteria. In such a case a signature is a result of 
checking headers matching the criteria, which is record-
ed in a particular order defined by the algorithm. It is 
possible to identify a client, having a previously pre-
pared list of signatures. 
It is necessary to notice, that one client can match 
more than one signature. It is caused by different prin-
ciples of HTTP request headers generation depending 
on the type of request data and a stage of a dialog with 
server [2]. 
The length of a signature (Fig. 4) is fixed and is 
equal to 48 bits, or bytes, or 12 characters in hexadeci-
mal. 
 
 
 
Fig. 4 – Example of a signature 
A signature data structure is summarized in Table 2: 
Table 2. 
A signature data structure 
 
 
 
The list of criteria, which we used in the algorithm, 
is sorted by bits order: 
1) HTTP protocol version is not 1.0, if header 
“accept” contains “text/html”. 
2) Headers “host”, “connection”, “user-agent”, 
“accept” are present. 
3) Header “connection” contains “keep-alive” and 
does not contain “close”. 
4) Length of header “User-agent” is more than 16 
symbols and contains “(” symbol. 
5) Header “accept” contains “*/*” element, header 
“accept-language” does not contain “*” and in 
the case of “accept-charset” header presence, 
it contains “*”. 
6) Header “accept-encoding” does not contain 
substrings “identity”, “x-gzip”, “te”, “keep-
alive”, “z-uidh”; 
7) Header “accept-encoding” contains “gzip” 
substring. 
8) Header “Accept-encoding” contains “deflate” 
substring. 
9) At least one of the headers: “x-forwarded-for”, 
“via”, “x-bluecoat-via”, “x-proxy-id”, “x-
Bits 
range 
Bits 
count Meaning 
1-8 8 
Information on a client support of latest protocols, 
presence of required headers and absence of mal-
formation. 
9-12 4 
Flags, by which a client is leveled according to the 
algorithm categories (“connection via proxy serv-
er”, “mobile device”, “has strong characteristics of 
an intellectual agent”). 
13-16 4 Particular client attributes, specific protocols assis-tance, data syntax etc. 
17-24 8 
Availability of headers from the predefined set 
(from, user-agent, host, connection, accept, accept-
encoding, accept-language, accept-charset). 
25-48 24, 8 to 3 Order of headers, listed above. 
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piper-id”, “clientip”, “proxy-connection” is 
present. 
10) At least one of the headers: “x-operamini-
features”, “x-operamini-phone”, “x-
operamini-phone-ua”, “x-nokia-musicshop-
version”, “x-nokia-musicshop-bearer”, “x-
wap-profile”, “x-att-deviceid”, “x-ebo-ua”, 
“device-stock-ua” is present. Or header “user-
agent” contains a substring: “android”, 
“bada”, “iphone”, “ipad”, “ipod”, “symbian” 
or “windows ce”. 
11) Header “from” or “x-goog-source” is present. 
Or header “user-agent” contains substrings: 
“craw”, “bot”, “slurp”, “spider”, “agent". 
12) Header “User-agent” contains substrings: 
“libwww”, “curl”, “wget”, “lynx”, “urllib”, 
“ruby”, “php”, “perl”, “python”, “java”, 
“http://”. Or the 4th ot 5th criteria is not 
satisfied. Or the 10th criteria is not satisfied 
and a tag “pragma” is present, or the headers 
“host”, “connection” or “user-agent” are 
missing. 
13) Value of header “accept” is not equal to “*/*” 
and does not contain “text/html”. 
14) Header “accept-encoding” contains substring 
“sdch”. 
15) Header “connection” contains uppercase 
symbols. 
16) Header “accept-encoding” does not contain “ ” 
(space) symbol. 
17) Header “from” is present. 
18) Header “user-agent” is present. 
19) Header “host” is present. 
20) Header “connection” is present. 
21) Header “accept” is present. 
22) Header “accept-encoding” is present. 
23) Header “accept-language” is present. 
24) Header “accept-charset” is present. 
HTTP-request (example is on Fig. 1) contains head-
er User-Agent with data of client’s software and its ver-
sions. Application of the signature method gives us a 
possibility to check information, specified in request 
headers. Before handling the request a new-formed cli-
ent signature is compared with signatures, which meet 
the software specified in User-Agent string. If a client 
falsifies software, trying to send false User-Agent, a 
flow analyzer detects the substitution with a high prob-
ability. On this ground the decision of request’s affilia-
tion to intellectual agent, and in the case of DDoS-
attack – to malicious client is made. 
Let’s denote the client signature of incoming HTTP-
request as Sr. 
 is set of database signatures, cor-
responding to the software, specified in User-Agent 
HTTP header. This module checks incoming HTTP-
request according to the following rule: 
IF (Sr  S) THEN THEN r → RNL ELSE r → RL 
 
Example of incoming HTTP-request check 
 
Let’s assume that incoming HTTP request is one 
from the listing 1.3. The client IP address belongs to 
China, and the list of allowed countries includes only 
Ukraine and Russia. The HTTP-request frequency from 
the client IP is 10 requests per minute, while the con-
figured threshold is 1 request per second. 
1) x4 = {“Mozilla/5.0”,“(”, “X11”, 
“Ubuntu”, “ Linux”, “x86_64”, “ rv:18.0”, “)”}
 
 
Substrings = {“bot”, “index”, “spider”, “crawl”, 
“wget”, “slurp”, “libwww”, “curl”, “wget”, 
“lynx”, “urllib”, “ruby”, “php”, “perl”, “python”, 
“java”, “http://”} 
T = 1 
The condition checked in accordance to the rule is 
wrong, so the check passes to the next module. 
2) Let’s assume that a client handles 
JavaScript code successfully. Then x13=1. The 
condition checked in accordance to the rule is 
wrong, so the check passes to the next module. 
3) x14 = {“CN”} 
C = {“UA”, “RU”} 
x14  C ⇒ r → RNL 
The third module makes a decision of HTTP-request 
illegitimacy and breaks the chain. The fourth module is 
not involved in the process of checking due to the pre-
vious module decision. 
 
Results 
 
Combination of the obtained theoretical and experi-
mental results let us form a thin Nginx [5] and Lighttpd 
[6] web-server environment. 
To exaggerate the malicious client problem of de-
termination the logic of the sent JavaScript-code, a code 
compilation with further obfuscation is applied on the 
second level of a flow analyzer. Herewith the readabil-
ity of a script significantly deteriorates. 
Maxmind GeoIP database “GeoIP Country” is used 
for making decision of request handling based on geo-
attributes. Depending on specifics of defended web-
resources other versions of GeoIP may be used [7]. 
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Applying the signature method, a web-sites 
www.amonis.com.ua and www.kononenko.ws visitors’ 
(legitimate clients and intellectual agents) signatures da-
tabase is formed. The web-sites belong to the authors of 
the paper. Google, Yandex, Yahoo and Bing intellectual 
agents’ signatures are shown as an example in Table 3. 
Table 3. 
List of intellectual agents’ signatures 
 
 
To check a system’s defense the synthetic test was 
carried out. An attack was performed by requests of dif-
ferent difficulty levels, taking into consideration the 
logic of the system. The chart (Fig. 5) is created in a re-
al-time mode. Requests to HttpStubStatusModule were 
sent with 30-seconds interval and “Active connections” 
values were taken. 
 
 
 
Fig. 5 – Web-server active connections, the requests of 
which are being handled  
 
The plot can be divided into four specific areas: 
before 09:51  there is no attack. Web-
server is processing requests 
in normal mode; 
09:52 - 10:03  DDoS-attack is active. De-
fense system is disabled. 
10:03 - 10:07  DDoS-attack is active. De-
fense system is enabled.  
Gradual closing of malicious 
client’s session is observed; 
after 10:07    DDoS-attack is active. De-
fense system is enabled. 
As we can see, the amount of active connections 
during DDoS-attack with enabled defense system ex-
ceeds the same value during a normal mode. And at the 
same time a defense system provides conditions, which 
allow successful processing of legitimate requests. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In the case of distributed attack (DDoS) obvious 
signs, which can be used for malefactor detection are 
missing. Checking HTTP-request legitimacy is not pro-
vided by HTTP-protocol or TCP-protocol, which is 
used as transport protocol. In this paper the method of 
defense against DDoS-attacks is proposed. It is based 
on a prior analysis of incoming HTTP-request. Due to a 
multilevel structure of a flow analyzer a minimization 
of resources, spent by a flow analyzer for request han-
dling, is achieved. 
Malicious requests complete filtration is not 
achieved. This fact is obvious from the plot, which was 
built during the synthetic test. But at the same time a 
defense system provides conditions, which allow a suc-
cessful processing of legitimate requests. 
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